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This article examines the social forces underlying FIFAgate. Why do corrupt
practices, which are often highly consolidated or even institutionalized, suddenly
become scandalous? What is a scandal? Why did FIFA fall into crisis in 2015
and not before? To answer these questions, it is necessary to look at the sequence
of thrusts and parries between all the parties involved. Our analysis embraces the
notion that social processes are based on relationships in order to provide insights
into why and how denunciations can lead to long-tolerated corrupt practices sud-
denly becoming compromising enough to force an organization’s leaders to
implement measures that would have previously been unimaginable. We use mul-
tiple sources to examine the emergence of FIFAgate and the way FIFA overcame
previous critical situations, describing how FIFA neutralized earlier allegations
and developed a remarkable ‘resilience’ to scandal. Finally, we analyse the suc-
cessive mobilizations whose domino effect led to the emergence of FIFAgate and
the measures FIFA took to contain the scandal. Our research enabled us to draw
up a new theoretical model for analysing corruption scandals.
Introduction
Christian Favre, journalist, radio news presenter: ‘To conclude, does Sepp Blatter, as
we are often told, does he run his FIFA honestly or not?’
Joël Robert, journalist, head of the sports desk: ‘Well, you know, he runs it honestly
because, logically and legally, there have been legal proceedings, but Blatter and FIFA
have never been caught out. There are still proceedings under way. I tell you that
Blatter will be re-elected very comfortably. He will keep going. He has been at FIFA
for 30 years, president since ’98, but, clearly, if a corruption or some other sort of scan-
dal breaks, well, in that case, Blatter will fall from his throne. But, at the moment, he
is solidly seated on that throne.’ (28 August 2014)1
This exchange between two journalists speaking live on Swiss public radio shows
that suspicions of corruption within the Fédération Internationale de Football Associ-
ation (FIFA) had already emerged before the ‘FIFAgate’ scandal broke in 2015.
More than just rumours, leaks by whistleblowers had led to explicit allegations by
‘critical voices’ (Andrew Jennings, Change FIFA, Transparency International, Play
the Game) and police enquiries. In fact, for many years, media investigations, nota-
bly by the BBC, The Guardian and The Sunday Times, had uncovered evidence of
corrupt practices within FIFA, although they had never managed to directly incrimi-
nate the organisation’s Swiss president, Sepp Blatter. The ability of the world’s most
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powerful sports institution, alongside the International Olympic Committee (IOC),
to neutralize allegations of corruption contributed to the widely shared idea, even
among Blatter’s opponents, that its leader (‘the unbudgeable’) would always manage
to dodge the accusations. This reputation of invincibility made it more difﬁcult to
denounce goings on at FIFA and added to Blatter’s symbolic capital.2 However, like
all organizations, FIFA was vulnerable to changes in its relations with other
institutions (sporting, political, economic, legal, media), and ‘FIFAgate’, like
everyother scandal3, was the result of a sudden reconﬁguration of these intra- and
inter-institutional relations.
The present article examines the social forces underlying FIFAgate. What is a
scandal? Why do corrupt practices, which are often highly consolidated or even
institutionalized, suddenly become scandalous? Why did FIFA fall into crisis in
2015 and not before? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to look at
the sequence of thrusts and parries between the numerous parties involved, including
sports executives, public relations companies, sports marketing agencies, politicians,
journalists, magistrates, lawyers and multinational sponsors. By embracing the
notion that social processes are based on relationships, our model provides insights
into why and how denunciations can lead to long-tolerated corrupt practices sud-
denly becoming compromising enough to force an organization’s leaders to imple-
ment measures that would have previously been unimaginable (resignations,
desertions, revisions to rules). We begin by discussing the limitations of most
previous social science researches into corruption, which have tended to focus on
transgressions while paying little attention to a factor we believe to be crucial, that
is the extremely variable cost of denunciations. We then describe our relational
approach to analysing scandals and the methods and sources used in our case study.
Finally, we look at the way FIFA overcame previous critical situations and examine
the successive mobilizations whose domino effect led to the emergence of FIFAgate,
together with the measures FIFA took to contain the most serious scandal in its
history.
Corruption as an object: the state of the art
Corruption has been a research object in the social sciences for many years, giving
rise to numerous studies4 based on a variety of concepts, methods, disciplines,
sources and ﬁelds of observation. Nevertheless, analyses of political corruption con-
tinue to dominate this vast literature.5 Although the tortuous dimension of these
shadowy practices makes observation, especially participant observation, difﬁcult
there is no lack of sources. Whether information is provided by administrative, judi-
cial, law enforcement or journalistic sources, it is likely to contain biases that have
to be taken into account, as such information is rarely collected scientiﬁcally.
Furthermore, much of the research into corruption has been carried out at the insti-
gation of powerful international organizations (IMF, World Bank, UNO, OECD,
Council of Europe and the Group of States Against Corruption – GRECO) or NGOs
(Transparency International). This has greatly inﬂuenced the focus of studies, which
have tended to concentrate on practical issues (how to measure and ﬁght corrup-
tion), thereby impinging on the objectiﬁcation required for scientiﬁc enquiry. For
example, since the 1960s, numerous researchers have examined the effects of cor-
ruption on development in third world countries. Some consider corruption to be a
necessary step towards economic growth and the emergence of ‘civil society’,
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whereas others see it as a vicious circle, especially for public conﬁdence. Outside
the developing world, corruption is often analysed in the light of its supposed inﬂu-
ence on social inequalities.6 The resulting focus on costs (economic, political,
social) within comparative quantitative studies raises the risk of decontextualization.
In the wake of the corruption indices produced by Transparency International,
researchers are increasingly using surveys and questionnaires to examine ‘ordinary’
citizens’ perceptions of small-scale and large-scale corruption.7 Here, corruption is
seen as contributing to people’s distrust of both government authorities and
companies.
These normative tendencies are emphasized even more in research focusing on
sport8, which tends to be carried out from a problem-solving perspective. This is
why revelations by investigative journalists9 and NGOs10 have been followed by
intense research into problems such as hooliganism, racism, doping, match-ﬁxing
and corruption. For example, Masters11 argues that organized sport has entered a
ﬁfth evolutionary phase – criminalization. In this latest phase, public policy needs to
grapple with what constitutes corruption in what has historically been a private mar-
ket. According to Becker12, FIFA can only restore public conﬁdence by setting up a
world anti-corruption agency in conjunction with other sport governing bodies.
Research in the ﬁeld of sports management, much of which has focussed on FIFA
and the IOC, has identiﬁed links between corruption and deﬁciencies in the control
and accountability of international sports organizations13, as well as looking at the
possible positive effects of social responsibility.14 With these tendencies among
scholars (problem-solving, focus on transgressions and/or on media, i.e. media-cen-
trism), sociology of sporting scandals is in limbo.15
Research into corruption, whether in sport or other sectors, has furthered under-
standing of the phenomenon, but the feasibility of denouncing corruption is an issue
that is never addressed. Nevertheless, we see this as a fundamental point in under-
standing the mechanisms underlying corruption scandals: the practices (misappropri-
ation of funds, bribery, breach of trust, fraudulent use of property, etc.) covered by
this polysemous word only become scandalous when the people who see them as
scandalous manage to gain support in several social spheres. Despite the common
understanding of the word, and in contrast to most scientiﬁc papers on corruption,
which usually confound the committing of scandalous acts with scandal16, it takes
much more than revelations of wrongdoing to create a scandal and thereby strip the
people and institutions accused of these acts of their legitimacy – indignation, just
like denunciation, mobilization or sanctions, cannot be taken for granted.
A model for analysing scandals
Although scandals are frequent events in contemporary societies, they remain ill
deﬁned by social scientists, most of who consider them to be controversies centred
round wrongdoings by well-known ﬁgures, minor affairs inﬂated by the media. Due
to the rarity of speciﬁc studies17or summaries18, and the fact that both protagonists
and observers primarily see scandals as the revelation of transgressions, little is
known about the phenomenon. Consequently, academics’ attention continues to be
monopolized by the misdeeds committed, to the detriment of the process that
allowed the scandal to break.
Scandals occur when the people challenging another person’s or organization’s
probity are supported by simultaneous ‘multisectoral mobilisations’, that is
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mobilizations that take place in and between several social sectors.19 A scandal can
occur even if the ‘scandalous facts’ are unfounded (e.g. due to false accusations),
but most ‘scandalous facts’ (such as paying bribes) fail to lead to scandals. Conse-
quently, it would be misleading to equate scandal with transgression. Multisectoral
mobilizations are essential if a dispute between a few individuals is to turn into a
scandal, but they are rare because they are subject to the difﬁculties facing any col-
lective action, which are exacerbated when the practices being challenged are pro-
tected by strong collusions within and between powerful institutions. Such
collusions are not necessarily illegal or explicit. Often, they are based on the shared
expectations of leaders, who tend to close their eyes to the other party’s activities
(accepted as a ﬁeld of competence), feeling that they would have acted in a similar
way. These tacit agreements contribute greatly to the consolidation of institutions.20
As a result, only a miniscule fraction of scandalous acts result in scandals. Moving
the focus from transgressions to the protagonists’ perceptions and mobilizations
makes it easier to consider another central property of scandals, that is their conﬁgu-
ration as a series of emergent properties, that is, feedback loops in which ‘causes’
produce ‘effects’ which in turn affect the ‘causes’. This process is extremely impor-
tant in determining changes in how the protagonists perceive the situation.21
A scandal depends on an entanglement of independent and reversible points of
view produced in the light of mobilizations. Without these mobilizations, there is no
scandal; if the mobilizations stop, the scandal stops. These mobilizations, which cre-
ate and re-create each scandal, are highly dependent on changes in the protagonists’
evaluations of the situation. They are linked to oscillations in perceptions of what is
(im)possible,22 that is, evaluations that arise out of the action via the senses, calcula-
tions and habitus23 of interconnected players. If an individual’s opinion of what is
(un)feasible convinces that person to relay an accusation, other parties could do so,
too, because people base their actions on their perceptions of what others are doing
or will do. People are persuaded or dissuaded to move in a certain direction by their
assessments of what others are likely to do and of what is/is not doable. Because
perceptions of what is possible are interconnected, they can change very quickly,
with one perception reﬂecting on another. People’s contributions and their depen-
dence on the ‘context’ (i.e. the meaning they give to their environment) depend on
this reﬂective interplay. People act by observing others and react to ﬂuctuations in
their expectations. This is why scandals can abruptly produce a collective align-
ment24 and, by doing so, invert the balance of power. For example, the Festina
affair, which rocked the 1998 Tour de France, came to light because the ‘law of
silence’ that had long been obeyed by most of the protagonists (cyclists, doctors,
sports managers, journalists, organizers, politicians, etc.) was suddenly broken when
the Festina team doctor was arrested in possession of a stock of performance-
enhancing drugs and then cooperated with investigators by giving details of how
teams obtained banned substances. Our main thesis is that analysing these variations
in what the different players are prepared to do will provide insights into how scan-
dals of any sort erupt, grow and die out. Hence, accurately mapping the sometimes-
disconcerting variations in the feasibility of denouncing transgressions is central to
understanding scandal, especially for explaining the collapse of collusions – a
crucial factor in removing a protagonist’s legitimacy. For example, in 2007, the cred-
ibility of the organizers of the Tour de France was threatened by desertions and
threats of desertion by the media (two German television networks suddenly stopped
broadcasting the race), sponsors (two major German companies stated they would
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not renew their sponsorship), the IOC (leading to a rumour that cycling would be
excluded from the Olympics) and the Danish cycling federation (which excluded
yellow jersey holder Michael Rasmussen from the national team for the world cham-
pionships), etc.
An often-neglected aspect is that scandals evolve as they progress. Whether to
continue or halt one’s efforts, accuse or remain silent, desert or stay loyal, deny,
counter-accuse or retract – all these decisions depend on their makers’ evaluations
of the situation. These inter-subjective evaluations may be approximate and ﬁckle,
but they are crucial to the relations between protagonists. Swept along by unforesee-
able changes in relationships, new projections lead people to adopt a (new) position
on whether to support or oppose a public accusation. A scandal’s dynamic depends
on these micro-turning points.25 This type of self-generation means that each scan-
dal, rather than following a pre-established path, can be viewed as an open process
whose players, location, duration, stakes, balances of power and outcomes are not
ﬁxed in advance. Instead, they depend on a complex series of thrusts and parries
with uncertain and partly contingent outcomes. The size of a scandal depends on the
size of the mobilization and the amplitude of the oscillations in perceptions of what
is (im)possible. These two processes are correlated as the more the occupiers of a
ﬁeld are confronted with intrusions by outsiders, the more likely it is that these
intrusions will affect their assessments and actions. Thus, in the case of the scandals
affecting the Tour de France, the sudden and unexpected scrutiny of their actions by
journalists, police ofﬁcers, customs ofﬁcers, investigating magistrates and sports
ministers, etc. may have increased the temptation felt by some competitors to spill
the beans about doping. Using a relational perspective to move on from studying the
object of scandals to studying scandals as an object allows this type of dynamic to
be resituated in the continuum of social relations. A scandal is a reconﬁguring pro-
cess involving the recombining of these relations between and within several sectors.
The motors of this dynamic – multisectoral mobilizations and oscillations in percep-
tions of what is (im)possible – co-vary by varying the feasibility of denunciation.
Scandals can severely threaten the targeted institution, potentially wreaking
havoc on its hierarchy, rules and agenda. This is why ofﬁcials have to review their
positions and, whether they like it or not, set in motion institutional countermeasures
(implement reforms, suspend targeted staff, adopt or strengthen a code of ethics,
etc.) in order to contain or take control of the accusation, as the desectorization gen-
erated by a scandal could be extremely dangerous for the institution’s future. From
the ofﬁcials’ point of view, the effectiveness of these countermeasures, which are
sometimes very costly as they go against powerful interests (in 2012, the Union
Cycliste Internationale stopped protecting Lance Armstrong after years of collusion),
is measured in terms of their ability to stop the multisectoral mobilizations.
Reducing these mobilizations and oscillations in perceptions of what is (im)possible
allow the institution under threat to overcome the crisisby enablingit to regain some
of its autonomy. If this is not achieved, the crisis worsens and becomes systemic
(see Figure 1).
Our case study examines an on-going scandal and therefore faces a number of
methodological problems, including the protagonists’ lack of time and/or reticence
to give interviews, no access to archive records, a ﬂuid chronology and dependence
on journalistic sources. However, this situation has the advantage of not being
susceptible to the ‘retrospective illusion’.26
Soccer & Society 5
Our sources for this research were newspaper articles from around the world
(Switzerland, France, United States, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom – approx. 500
articles), FIFA ﬁles, general investigative media (Mediapart in France, Il Fatto
Quotidiano in Italy, Der Spiegel in Germany, Sunday Times and The Guardian in
the UK, New York Times in the USA, Le Temps in Switzerland), specialist sports
newspapers (e.g. L’Equipe and France Football), materials produced by some of the
Denunciation Sectoral crisis
Multisectoral 
mobilisation
Systemic crisis
Oscillations
in perceptions of what 
is (im)possible
(Breaks in)
collusion
Institutional 
ripostes
FAILURE SUCCESS
Crisis overcome and/or
containment of the dispute
No reaction
Restricted 
mobilisation
Figure 1. Model for analysing scandals.
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protagonists (investigative journalists: Jennings, Yallop, a FIFA consultant, Pieth27),
documentaries (ARD, BBC, RTS, etc.), an indictment (USA v. J. Webb et al.28),
NGO reports (Transparency International; Play the Game), governmental and inter-
governmental reports (FATF29; GRECO30), the IOC31, and reports of measures made
public by FIFA (FIFA.com), especially between 2010 and 2015. These data allowed
us to reconstruct how the scandal’s exceptional dynamic annihilated the customary
ability of FIFA’s leaders to protect themselves. We were also able to look back on
earlier FIFA crises and therefore more clearly describe the context surrounding the
FIFAgate.
FIFA’s resilience: neutralizing allegations
Although allegations of corruption have been levelled at FIFA ofﬁcials on numerous
occasions throughout the federation’s history, especially since João Havelange’s long
presidency (1974–1998), until 2015 FIFA had always been able to isolate its accu-
sers and quash any litigation. Before analysing the measures introduced by FIFA to
contain these conﬂicts, we will look back at the accusations and the people who
made them, most of who were journalists or senior managers/staff at FIFA.
In his book How They Stole the Game, the English journalist and best-selling
author David Yallop suggests that Blatter, then FIFA’s secretary general, was elected
president of FIFA (by 111 votes to 80) not just because of the support he was given
by the powerful outgoing president, João Havelange, but also thanks to votes bought
from African representatives.32 These allegations were never proven and Blatter
won a legal battle to prevent the book being published in Switzerland. In 2006, the
Scottish journalist Andrew Jennings, working for the BBC’s Panorama programme,
investigated allegations of bribes paid in relation to the attribution of the World
Cup. This was the ﬁrst of a long series of documentaries and books about corruption
within FIFA,33 with Jennings willingly taking on the role of public accuser, as he
had done previously in relation to corruption at the IOC and the attribution of the
Olympic Games (1992, 2000). In 2010, journalists from The Sunday Times, a news-
paper that had been in the front line of accusations of doping in cycling, published
compromising recordings obtained by presenting themselves to FIFA ofﬁcials as
lobbyists for the USA’s bid to host the World Cup. In April 2010, South African
journalists associated with Jennings published a book34 lambasting FIFA for its
predatory way of operating, accumulating revenues and tax breaks while leaving all
expenditure to the host country. In January 2013, France Football began its
‘Qatargate dossier’, while, in June 2014, The Sunday Times claimed that FIFA’s
Qatari Vice-president, Mohamed Bin Hammam, had spent $5 million to obtain
votes, most notably from the presidents of 30 African federations, for Qatar’s bid to
host the World Cup. One of FIFA’s most inﬂuential representatives, Jack Warner,
was once again implicated. It was claimed that Warner, a Trinidadian businessman,
FIFA vice-president and president of the Confederation of North, Central American
and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) since 1990, had accepted $1.6
million from Bin Hammam. In April 2015, two Sunday Times journalists published
The Ugly Game,35 a blistering account of how Qatar allegedly bought the votes of
FIFA’s executive committee members.
Criticisms by FIFA ofﬁcials and mangers are by no means rare, especially in the
run up to or following election congresses and executive committee votes to choose
host countries for the World Cup. These stunts are picked up by the media and
Soccer & Society 7
prolong inﬁghting, but they are of no real consequence. In 2000, Germany was
narrowly awarded the 2006 World Cup (by 12 votes to 11) ahead of South Africa,
possibly thanks to the abstention of the Oceania Football Confederation’s president,
the New-Zealander Charles Dempsey. One of the reasons Dempsey gave for his sub-
sequent resignation from the executive committee was the pressure he had been put
under. In 2002, it was the turn of FIFA secretary general, Michel Zen-Rufﬁnen, to
resign after noting in his report ‘abuses of power’ and Blatter’s ‘dictatorial’ manage-
ment. In May 2011, Blatter’s challenger, Bin Hammam was accused by Chuck
Blazer, the secretary general of CONCACAF, of attempting to buy votes at a meet-
ing of Caribbean representatives by distributing envelopes containing $40,000. He
allegedly did this with the complicity of Jack Warner, who was suspended from
FIFA during an internal enquiry and who then accused Blatter of making a donation
of $1 million to his confederation. The accusation was quickly swept aside and
Bin Hammam withdrew shortly before the election, making Blatter the only
candidate.
Accusations can also come from whistleblowers who take part in or who witness
illicit transactions. In a documentary shown on the German public television channel
ARD on 4 May 2015, a former employee of the Qatar bid repeated her accusations
(published in France Football in December 2014), this time naming three African
members of FIFA’s executive committee who had been offered $1.5 million ‘encour-
agements’ by the Qatar delegation. Nevertheless, no sanctions were handed down.
More commonly, FIFA is called to task, or even targeted, by critical reports from a
number of institutions (FATF, 2009; Transparency International, 2011). Because
these accusations are not just allegations by journalists and/or insiders and are in the
public domain, FIFA is forced to react.
Through a repertoire of actions ranging from threatening libel suits or sacking
one or more administrators to adopting a code of ethics or reforming the federation’s
rules, FIFA is usually successful in quashing such accusations. Thanks to its crisis-
management experts, the co-option of members of internal commissions of inquiry
and (self-)censorship, investigations intended to get to the bottom of allegations
always remain conﬁdential and only the resulting decisions are divulged. This is also
the case for external checks, such as those carried out by the auditors KPMG, which
revealed hardly any irregularities in FIFA’s accounts for 2007–2010. Critical voices
within FIFA are removed by pushing people to resign (Michel Zen-Rufﬁnen in
2002, the marketing director Guido Tognoni in 2003), expelling representatives who
lack protection, often those from small federations, launching disciplinary proce-
dures, which have been unending since 2013 to the detriment of ofﬁcials from Sri-
Lanka, Mongolia, Nepal, India and Tahiti, and, more rarely, sanctioning important
ofﬁcials (vote carriers).
The reforms introduced by FIFA are one of the main ways in which it responds
to mobilizations it sees as hostile. An ethics committee and code of ethics were set
up in 2004, with revisions added to the code of ethics in 2006, 2009 and 2012. In
2011, following Blatter’s campaign promise to steer the ‘FIFA boat back into clear,
transparent waters’, an independent governance committee was formed, presided by
Mark Pieth, a Swiss university professor and expert in governance. Some of the rec-
ommendations contained in Pieth’s report,36 including dividing the ethics commis-
sion into investigatory and adjudicatory chambers, were adopted. The amendments
to FIFA’s statutes were put to the vote at the federation’s congress on 25 May 2012
and massively approved. They included strengthening the audit and compliance
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commission, introducing a code of conduct, appointing a woman to the executive
committee, appointing two women as observers, and attributing one World Cup at a
time. Age limits and length of mandate were not addressed, but the measures that
were passed appeared to increase FIFA’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, they did nothing
to challenge the organization’s clientelistic culture, made up of clanism, conﬂicts of
interest and nepotism (one of Blatter’s nephews heads Infront, the company respon-
sible for managing FIFA’s TV rights). Pieth called this system a ‘patronage net-
work’. These shady dealings are enough to satisfy the 24 members of the executive
committee and 10 directors, who received a total of $36.3 million in ‘indemnities’
in 2014,37 and FIFA’s partners, especially as the federation’s turnover has never
grown so quickly. Between 2011 and 2014, FIFA’s revenues amounted to $5.7 bil-
lion, most of which came from World Cup television rights ($2.45 billion in 2014,
20 times more than in 1998) and sponsorship contracts ($1.6billion). During the
same period, FIFA redistributed over $1 billion to national federations. These funds
are intended to ﬁnance development projects, but they also end up in the pockets of
individuals who, in return, provide ‘packets of votes’ for the president. These pow-
erful forms of collusion are based on an institutional architecture that sanctions the
‘political’ power of the continental associations and the independence of national
associations, over which the Zurich head ofﬁce has no direct control and whose
ofﬁcials are careful to keep their eyes shut.
The way in which the collapse of International Sport and Leisure (ISL) was han-
dled shows that FIFA’s ability to protect itself also depends on the benevolence of
other institutions. ISL was founded in 1982 by the head of Adidas, Horst Dassler, as
a specialist sports marketing company and had exclusive responsibility for managing
FIFA’s media rights during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the company went bankrupt in
2001. An investigation was carried out by Swiss magistrates, but the case ﬁle was
not made public until 2012. In fact, ISL had paid out CHF160 million in bribes
between 1989 and 2001.38 According to documents quoted by Play the Game, for-
mer FIFA president J. Havelange and his son-in-law, Ricardo Teixeira, the president
of the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF) and a member of FIFA’s executive
committee, received CHF41 million but Swiss magistrates refused to prosecute. In
2011, Havelange resigned from the post he had held at the IOC for 48 years and in
July 2013 he stepped down as honorary president of FIFA. In 2012, Teixeira also
left FIFA, for ‘medical reasons’, after 22 years at the head of the CBF, where he had
survived numerous allegations of embezzlement without ever being convicted. At
FIFA, the new ethics commission cleared Blatter in 2013: ‘President Blatter’s con-
duct could not be classiﬁed in any way as misconduct with regard to any ethics rules
… … (even if it) may have been clumsy’.
The collusions that helped protect FIFA from the accusations made against it
arise from a vast network of inter-institutional relations, starting with those that pre-
vail in Switzerland. Corrupt practices in the private sector are not prosecuted auto-
matically and it was not until 2004, in response to pressure from the OECD (and its
Financial Action Task Force – FATF) and the GRECO, that the Swiss government
made private corruption a misdemeanour (included in the Unfair Competition Act
but not in the Penal Code). Until then, bribes paid abroad by Swiss companies had
been tax deductible! On the grounds that international sport organizations are not
subject to competition, on 10 November 2004, Switzerland’s Federal Council
(government) assured them they would not be subject to the Unfair Competition
Act. Corrupt practices would be prosecuted only if one or more of the protagonists
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(corrupter or corrupted) ﬁled a complaint. As a result, there were no convictions for
private corruption between 2004 and 2014. This form of immunity, alongside other
powerful collusions (banking secret, failure to prosecute tax fraud, tolerance of tax
evasion, little regulation, low corporation tax – 4.25%) and other advantages (politi-
cal stability, protection of privacy) explain why around 60 international sports orga-
nizations are based in Switzerland, earning the country more than CHF1 billion
every year. Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2014, 25 of the 35 parliamentary
speeches concerning FIFA mentioned suspicions of corruption.39 Although the legal
pressure in Switzerland has increased a notch, a large majority of MPs are happy to
let the status quo continue.
On 26 September 2014, Hans-Joachim Eckert, the president of the adjudicatory
chamber of the ethics commission, minimized the conclusions of a report by the
president of the investigatory chamber, Michael J. Garcia, into suspicions of corrup-
tion in the attribution of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. FIFA announced that it
would not publish the report, as the requirement to maintain conﬁdentiality con-
tained in its code of ethics did not allow it to do so. Nevertheless, on 18 November
2014, Eckert ordered FIFA to provide Switzerland’s attorney general with a copy of
Garcia’s report. This ruling was not enough to stop the former U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York resigning (on 17 December) because of his indigna-
tion over the censorship of his report. Although for decades many players inside and
outside FIFA saw the federation as almost untouchable, FIFA’s resilience was situa-
tional – as long as accusations were not simultaneously and massively relayed in
several ﬁelds, the organization could easily maintain an image of stability.
FIFAgate: how the scandal damaged the organization’s legitimacy
For many years, the accusations of corruption against FIFA led to no more than
internal sanctions and sectoral crises. So, why did things change in 2015? In order
to grasp the size of the scandal and the institution’s sudden vulnerability it is neces-
sary to consider the multisectoral and simultaneous dimension of the accusations
that, from 27 May, turned the situation upside down and allowed the unthinkable to
happen.
On 27 May, the eve of the 65th FIFA congress, the United States Department of
Justice (DoJ) published a 161-page indictment drawn up by Brooklyn federal court
on 20 May and charging 14 defendants (9 FIFA ofﬁcials, including 2 vice-presi-
dents, and 5 sports company executives). The indictment refers to corruption that
had become ‘endemic’ (United States v. J. Webb, 32) ‘over a period of approxi-
mately 25 years’ within the FIFA ‘system’, and lists 47 counts of racketeering,
fraud, money laundering, bribes and kickbacks amounting to $150 million, etc. The
investigation had taken several years and was based on the Racketeer Inﬂuenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The bribes related to FIFA’s presidential
election in 2011, broadcasting rights, marketing contracts for competitions such as
the Copa America and sponsorship agreements. Ten other defendants pleaded guilty
between July 2013 and May 2015, including Blazer and two of Warner’s sons. Over
a period of 19 years, Blazer (‘Mr 10%’) had accumulated $11 million that he had
not declared to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As a result, he resigned as secre-
tary general of CONCACAF and pleaded guilty to 10 charges (racketeering, money
laundering, tax evasion, etc.) in an American court, with which he had secretly
cooperated for 16 months while remaining a member of FIFA’s executive committee.
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The collusion between Warner and Blazer collapsed in 2010 when Warner supported
Qatar’s bid for the World Cup and Bin Haman’s bid to become FIFA president,
while Blazer had supported the United States and Blatter.
In conjunction with the publication (on the Internet) of this indictment, the Swiss
police, acting on an American warrant, arrested seven ofﬁcials in a luxury hotel in
Zurich (New York Times journalists, tipped off by Brooklyn’s district attorney, were
at the scene). FIFA’s head ofﬁce was searched under a warrant issued by
Switzerland’s attorney general, who was investigating the attribution of the 2018
and 2022 World Cups, while the US authorities searched CONCACAF’s headquar-
ters in Miami. At the same time, the head of the DoJ, Loretta Lynch (who, impor-
tantly, had supervised the investigation as a federal prosecutor in Brooklyn) held a
news conference in New York alongside the heads of the FBI, James Comey, and of
the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division, Richard Weber, who spoke of a ‘World
Cupof fraud’ spanning ‘at least two generations of soccer ofﬁcials’. Lynch stated:
‘the indictment alleges corruption that is rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted both
abroad and here in the United States’.40 The cooperation between the Swiss and
American authorities surprised many commentators (‘Switzerland is playing an
unexpected double role’41), as there was no solid legal basis for it. In fact, this
action was part of the wider cooperation between the USA and Switzerland that had
arisen out of the banking scandals involving Swiss UBS (ﬁned $780 million) and
Crédit Swiss (ﬁned $2.6 billion, paid in 2014 in order to keep its trading licence in
the USA), which were prosecuted under the 2010 Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (FATCA), which came into force in 2014.
This operation, which was unprecedented in terms of the resources employed
and its multi-level coordination, led to an almost immediate response from FIFA.
On 27 May, the ethics commission’s adjudicatory chamber temporarily suspended
11 FIFA representatives. Another three ofﬁcials were suspended between 28 May
and 2 June. FIFA’s director of communications, Walter de Gregorio, repeatedly
stated that Blatter was not implicated and many people, including Blatter’s declared
opponents, believed he would be re-elected president once the scandal had blown
over. At the end of a congress marked by an unprecedented media mobilization and
demonstrators brandishing signs reading ‘Game over for Blatter’, the president’s re-
election (by 133 votes against 73 votes for Prince Ali, who decided not to force a
second round) suggested that the ‘unbudgeable’ would extricate himself again:
‘Despite the scandals, Sepp Blatter manages to win’,42 ‘The secrets of the unsink-
able “captain”’.43 Nevertheless, the chairman of the English Football Association
said he would be ‘very surprised’ if Blatter were to last more than two years.
However, the scale of desertions exceeded all expectations, precipitating Blatter’s
fall. In fact, most Swiss newspapers had already turned against him by 28 May: ‘Mr
.Blatter, go’ was the title of the editorial of the Vaud canton’s biggest daily paper,
24 Heures; ‘Blatter has lost his credibility’ was the headline in Le Matin, while an
editorial in Le Temps announced ‘The end of impunity’ and L’Hebdo wrote of ‘Sepp
Blatter’s seven deadly sins’. In the UK, members of parliament called for a boycott
of the 2022 World Cup and, as a gesture of protest, England’s FIFA representative
David Gill refused to serve on the executive committee. At the same time, FIFA’s
corporate sponsors (more than a third of its revenues) voiced their fears by threaten-
ing to review their sponsorship, as the scandal had given them the opportunity to
renegotiate their contracts. Long-term critics of the ‘FIFA system’ were even
harsher, with Guido Tognoni writing: ‘for the last 40 years, since Havelange was
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enthroned, FIFA has had a culture of corruption. Blatter didn’t start it, but he has
always tolerated corruption. It was a way of staying in power’ (he estimated
Blatter’s annual ‘salary’ to be CHF15 million).44 Two members of the Swiss parlia-
ment put forward an action plan to combat corruption in sport and in its 3 June edi-
tion The New York Times noted ‘the widespread impression of FIFA as a corrupt
rogue state’. At the same time, the European newspapers behind many of the inves-
tigations of FIFA renewed their enquiries (The Guardian and The Sunday Times in
England, Mediapart in France, Il Fatto Quotidiano in Italy, Der Spiegel in Germany,
etc.). Some referred to ‘practices worthy of a maﬁa clan’,45, and it became quite
common to draw parallels between FIFA and a maﬁa organization. Others, which
had supported Blatter, distanced themselves from him.
Nevertheless, some collusions continued. By sitting next to Blatter at the opening
of the congress and having defended him the day before at the Swiss Media Forum,
Switzerland’s Minister of Defence and Sports Ueli Maurer, showed his continuing
support, while Peter Gilliéron, the president of the Swiss Football Association and a
member of UEFA’s executive committee, carefully watched his words. In the eyes
of some of FIFA’s staff, Blatter had not lost his credibility and on 3 June he was
applauded at FIFA headquarters. The same day, Switzerland’s Council of States (the
upper chamber of parliament) refused, by 23 votes to 22, to follow the Federal
Council’s recommendation on prosecuting private corruption, which would not,
therefore, be prosecuted automatically. It seemed it was still possible to publicly
acknowledge instances of give and take. For example, the president of the French
Football Federation, who had supported Blatter’s election because France had just
been awarded the 2019 Women’s World Cup, claimed: ‘our relations with FIFA are
extremely good (…) I like to return a favour when someone has given us
something’.46
Four days after his re-election, Blatter, in a dramatic turn, announced: ‘I have
decided to lay down my mandate at an extraordinary elective congress’. This deci-
sion was taken following the accusations levelled at FIFA’s secretary general and
Blatter’s right-hand man, Jérôme Valke, in an article in The New York Times about a
payment of $10 million to CONCACAF in 2008 as a ‘commission’ in exchange for
votes to award the 2010 World Cup to South Africa. This turnaround made
denouncing FIFA much easier: ‘Blatter, the fall of FIFA’s big boss’, ran the headline
in Le Nouvelliste on 3 June, a daily where Blatter worked in the 1960s,47 with the
American media suggesting that the FBI was investigating Blatter. The destruction
of Blatter’s and FIFA’s reputations led Swiss political leaders to voice their fears
about Switzerland’s image.48 The heads of several Western governments (especially
in the UK, France and Germany) simultaneously came out against Blatter, some-
thing that only the British prime minister, in 2010, and the Brazilian president,
Dilma Roussef, had done previously. On the other hand, President Putin gave Blatter
his ofﬁcial support against ‘yet another ﬂagrant attempt (by the United States) to
extend its jurisdiction to other states’.49 These ofﬁcial positions reﬂected other pow-
erful geopolitical interests, with governments considering sport an important vector
of soft power.50
Many people quickly saw how vulnerable FIFA had become, a turnaround
(effect) resulting from a series of defections (cause), which, in turn, facilitated these
defections, hence the effect acted on the cause in a form of expanding loop. It is in
this way, as an emergent process, that a scandal can so rapidly disrupt a powerful
institution. The crisis achieved a dimension never before seen at FIFA, which had to
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face a concomitance of large oscillations in perceptions of what was (im)possible.
‘It is a shock, the surprise we no longer expected to happen, we had got so used to
seeing Sepp Blatter weather every storm’; ‘The extent of the abuses exposed in
recent days is such that other continents, other federations could be affected’.51 The
term FIFAgate, ﬁrst used as a Twitter hashtag on 27 May and quickly picked up by
most other media,52, neatly summarizes this transformative event. The scandal has
affected positions and stances, with the head of the audit and compliance commis-
sion, Domenico Scala, who was given the task of devising a programme of reform,
suddenly being seen as a ‘Mr .Clean’ and the reformer of FIFA. The extent of the
turnaround in the thinkable that produced and was produced by the scandal forced
many people to change their plans. These interdependent moves also explain why,
on 29 May, after years of unsuccessful attempts, Brazilian senators hastily decided
to set up a parliamentary commission of enquiry into the CBF, and why the Brasilia
prosecutor, who used to consider Teixeira ‘a too big ﬁsh for me’, changed her mind
and decided to prosecute him for money laundering and fraud. Brazilian police had
found that several of his bank accounts had been swollen by ‘unusual’ payments
totalling €133.5 million between 2009 and 2012, when Teixeira was president of the
2014 World Cup organizing committee. Several attacks that had formerly been con-
sidered too risky, such as threatening to withdraw the 2018 and 2022 World Cups,
were suddenly seen as doable, especially in the eyes of British and American ofﬁ-
cials. For example, the chairman of the English Football Association said: ‘We can
go back and look at those two World Cups. If I was in Qatar today, I wouldn’t be
feeling too conﬁdent’.53
Encouraged by the multisectoral mobilizations and large oscillations in percep-
tions of the (im)possible, FIFAgate has triggered a ﬂood of other revelations and
accusations. On 4 May, John Delaney, the president of the Irish Football Federation,
admitted that his federation had accepted a large sum of money from FIFA in
exchange for not pressing a complaint against France for a refereeing error during a
qualifying match for the 2010 World Cup (a ﬁgure of €5 million has been sug-
gested). On 25 October, the German World Cup affair resurfaced. Der Spiegel
claimed that a slush fund had been set up and, for the ﬁrst time, Franz Beckenbauer
admitted ‘a mistake’ had been made. Some allegations were made in order to colour
opinions of certain protagonists. For example, on 3 June, the DoJ made Blazer’s
confession public. The same day, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Lynch said information had been passed on to other countries, including
Switzerland.
In this context of great uncertainty linked to the desectorization of the dispute,
the standings of the leading contenders to succeed Blatter as FIFA president ﬂuctu-
ated as the scandal went on. Originally the ﬁrm favourite due to his new opposition
to Blatter, Michel Platini soon found himself the subject of new allegations. Prince
Ali went on the attack and Blatter was quick to point out that Platini had voted for
Qatar (recruitment of his son, agreement between president Sarkozy, Qatar’s crown
prince Al-Thani, his prime minister and a representative of Colony Capital, the own-
ers of PSG, during a dinner Platini attended at the Elysée Palace on 23 November
201054). On 25 September, Switzerland’s attorney general began investigating
Blatter for ‘disloyal management’ and ‘abuse of trust’ in relation to the signature of
‘an unfavourable contract’ with the Caribbean Football Union. Blatter was also
accused of making a ‘disloyal payment’ of €1.83 million to Platini, with the result
that Platini lost a section of his support from the French media. On 2 October,
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FIFA’s largest American sponsors (Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Visa, Budweiser)
demanded Blatter’s immediate resignation after a criminal investigation against him
was launched in Switzerland. On 8 October, Platini, Blatter and Valcke were given
90-day suspensions by the ethics committee. In addition, a former FIFA Vice-
president, Chung Mong-oon (candidate in the forthcoming presidential election),
was suspended for six years and ﬁned CHF100,000. At the deadline for registering
as a candidate in the presidential election, on 26 October, Platini was one of eight
candidates, but the decision by UEFA’s executive committee to support the candi-
dacy of its secretary general, Gianni Infantino, was seen as a ‘disavowal of Platini’.
On 21 December, FIFA’s ethics committee ﬁnally sanctioned Platini and Blatter for
‘conﬂict of interests’ and ‘disloyal management’, suspending them for eight years
and imposing heavy ﬁnes.
At FIFA’s extraordinary congress on 26 February 2016, Gianni Infantino was
elected the organization’s new president and a number of reforms of governance
were passed. These included ensuring a clear separation of political and managerial
powers, reducing the number of committees from 26 to 9, limiting the president’s
term of ofﬁce (12 years), requiring individuals to disclose their remuneration,
improving recognition for women and increasing their role and imposing a require-
ment to respect human rights. Some reforms, such as the requirement to provide
independent annual audits and create independent judicial bodies to ensure the sepa-
ration of powers at all levels of football, also apply to member associations and con-
federations. Most of these measures were proposed by a reform committee that had
been formed in August 2015 along similar lines to the reform committee set up by
the IOC 15 years ago. In fact, for its protagonists, FIFAgate is reminiscent of the
scandal surrounding the awarding of the Olympic Games to Salt Lake City in 1998,
especially as the subsequent measures taken by the IOC were generally seen ‘as
effective, if partial’.55 Hence, the way IOC managed the Salt Lake City scandal
(‘responsible autonomy’56) served as a ‘focal point’57 for expectations and a possi-
ble solution.58 Hence, it was widely felt that the solutions introduced by the IOC
could provide a model for overcoming the FIFAgate crisis. FIFA’s riposte of 11
August, when the federation announced the creation of the 2016 reform committee,
to be presided by 77-year-old Swiss lawyer, François Carrard, a former general
manager of the IOC and the coordinator of the ‘IOC 2000’ reform committee, can
certainly by interpreted in this way.
Unlike the reforms previously implemented by FIFA, these measures are being
supervised by external institutions (DoJ, FBI). In fact, the US Department of Justice
required FIFA to go victim within the framework of corruption cases. The DoJ’s
work at FIFA’s headquarters is being carried out in conjunction with an American
law ﬁrm (Quinn Emanuel), which, since June 2015, has allocated considerable
resources to the investigation of corruption cases, ‘a victim of which FIFA would
have been’. As a result, the unthinkable happened – for the ﬁrst time, FIFA accused
a country (South Africa) of buying the right to host the World Cup, moreover, a
judicial dissolution of the FIFA is no longer excluded. Due to the pressure of the
mobilizations that paralyzed the executive committee (11 out of 24 members are
being prosecuted), the institution’s heteronomy goes with the empowerment of some
of its components (the audit and compliance committee, reform committee). In an
interview published on 7 June 2015, the president of FIFA’s audit and compliance
committee, D. Scala, stated that Russia and Qatar would possibly no longer be eligi-
ble to host the FIFA World Cup competitions in 2018 and 2022 if proof of bribery
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was found. Nevertheless, FIFA’s new strongman felt he had to resign following
Gianni Infantino’s decision at the FIFA Congress in Mexico City in May 2016,
which passed an amendment giving FIFA’s executives the power to appoint and sack
the presidents of the ethics and audit commissions. Hence, the FIFA crisis appears
to be continuing, as its new executives, in contrast to the IOC in 2000, have been
unable to contain the never-ending series of disputes (revelations at the beginning of
June: $80 million of suspicious payments to Blatter and two other top ofﬁcials, con-
troversy over the new president’s salary and the appointment of the new secretary
general, accusations by Blatter of rigging of the draws for major competitions, etc.).
Conclusion
We have shown how, for many years, FIFA’s executives managed to contain the
mobilizations that formed around allegations of corruption. However, when these
mobilizations became multisectoral, on 27 May 2015, they created an uncontrollable
and self-perpetuating serial-feedback process that, most importantly, made it easier
for new denunciations to emerge. Hence, within just a few weeks, numerous protag-
onists with a variety of motives came forward to level accusations at FIFA’s top
executives, leading (at last) to a vehement public outcry against the corrupt practices
within the federation.
The primary objective of this article is to propose a new theoretical framework
for analysing scandals. A scandal is both the product and the producer of changing
anticipations, a complex, moving and disruptive reconﬁguration of the relationships
inside and between several ﬁelds. As for any huge scandal, FIFAgate can be under-
stood in terms of a sequential phase of multisectoral mobilizations (across the legal,
political, economic, media and sport ﬁelds) linked to major changes in the actors’
perceptions, which allow them to do things they would previously considered
unthinkable. These new perceptions are conducive to new kinds of action. They are
self-fulﬁlling, but still very contingent and reversible. The feasibility of denunciation
can vary enormously during this process, which is why scandals are unanticipated
and uncontrollable. They also tend to occur in clusters, as can be seen in the web of
scandals that emerged in the wake of FIFAgate (IAAF in November 2015; match
ﬁxing in tennis January 2016; doping by British athletes in April 2016).
The ultimate lesson to be learnt from FIFAgate is that the involvement of one or
more powerful institutions (in this case, the US DoJ and FBI) is a necessary but
insufﬁcient condition for a scandal to occur, as mobilizations must be multisectoral
and simultaneous if they are to generate a crisis within the collusions that underlie
the formation of a culture of corruption within an institution.
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